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Abstract
Consider a situation with n agents or players where some of the players form
a coalition with a certain collective objective. Simple games are used to model
systems that can decide whether coalitions are successful (winning) or not (losing).
A simple game can be viewed as a monotone boolean function. The dimension of
a simple game is the smallest positive integer d such that the simple game can
be expressed as the intersection of d threshold functions where each threshold
function uses a threshold and n weights. Taylor and Zwicker have shown that d is
bounded from above by the number of maximal losing coalitions. We present two
new upper bounds both containing the Taylor/Zwicker-bound as a special case.
The Taylor/Zwicker-bound imply an upper bound of
(
n
n
2
)
. We improve this upper
bound significantly by showing constructively that d is bounded from above by
the cardinality of any binary covering code with length n and covering radius 1.
This result supplements a recent result where Olsen et al. showed how to construct
simple games with dimension |C| for any binary constant weight SECDED code
C with length n. Our result represents a major step in the attempt to close the
dimensionality gap for simple games.
1 Introduction
Consider a multi agent system where a coalition of agents is formed in order to solve
a given task and where we have to predict if the coalition will succeed or not. We
restrict our attention to cases obeying the natural monotonicity condition saying that
the superset of any successful coalition will also succeed. In such a multi agent system
we need some sort of system that can compute a prediction: ”yes” or ”no”. The so-
called simple games model such systems and simple games can also be viewed as
monotone boolean functions or monotone hypergraphs. The agents in a simple game
are referred to as players and successful and unsuccessful coalitions will be referred to
as winning and losing coalitions respectively.
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A weighted game is a special type of simple game where every player is assigned a
weight and where a coalition is successful if and only if the total weight of the players
in the coalition is meeting or exceeding a given quota. Any simple game can be imple-
mented as the intersection of one or more weighted games and the dimension [14] of
a simple game is the minimum number of weighted games we need to implement the
simple game in this way. The dimension has a direct influence on the storage require-
ments and the efficiency for such a system. Real world voting systems can be seen
as simple games and the dimension aspects of real world voting systems have been
studied intensively within the field of Computational Social Choice.
In this paper, we consider the maximum dimension, dn, that we can obtain for a
simple game with n players. Taylor and Zwicker [14] have shown that ( n⌊n/2⌋) is an
upper bound for dn by demonstrating how to implement any simple game as the inter-
section of no more than
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
games (details will follow later). The main contribution
of this paper is a constructive major improvement of the generic upper bound provided
by Taylor and Zwicker that we present in the form of two new upper bounds both
representing stronger versions of the upper bound presented by Taylor and Zwicker.
We apply a technique that – to the best of our knowledge – has not been used
before to translate any simple game into the intersection of relatively few simple games.
Recently, Olsen et al. [12] demonstrated a major improvement in the lower bound on
dn by using theory on error correcting codes. We use a significantly different and
novel approach based on covering codes to obtain our upper bounds. The gap between
the upper and lower bound has for some n gone from a factor n to
√
n (roughly)
through our improvement and to a factor lnn
√
n in general. We conclude by suggesting
a direction that might lead to a further reduction of the dimensionality gap.
2 Related Work
Taylor and Zwicker [14] have constructed a sequence of games with dimension at least
2
n
2
−1 for n = 2k with k odd. The dimension of the simple games presented by Taylor
and Zwicker was later shown to be exactly 2n2−1 [12]. Freixas and Puente [8] have
shown how to construct another type of simple games with dimension 2n2 −1 for all
even n. This lower bound of dn was recently improved significantly by Olsen et al. [12]
by establishing a connection to the theory on error correcting codes resulting in the
following lower bound:
dn ≥ 1
n
(
n
⌊n2 ⌋
)
∈ 2n−o(n) . (1)
Here it might be useful to consider the following identity for comparison with the
previous lower bound:
(
n
⌊n2 ⌋
)
= (1− o(1))
√
2
pin
2n . (2)
Kurz and Napel [10] also present a general approach for the determination of lower
bounds for the dimension of a simple game.
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A maximal losing coalition in a simple game is a losing coalition that has the prop-
erty that adding any player will turn it into a winning coalition. Let LM denote the
collection of maximal losing coalitions. Taylor and Zwicker [14] demonstrate how to
express any simple game as an intersection of at most |LM | weighted games implying
an |LM |-upper bound for dn. Kurz and Napel [10] provide heuristic algorithms based
on integer linear programming for constructing a representation of a given simple game
as an intersection of weighted games.
As mentioned earlier, the dimension of real world voting systems has been the
focus for several studies. The Amendment of the Canadian constitution [9] and the US
federal legislative system [15] have dimension 2. The voting systems of the Legislative
Council of Hong Kong [3] and the Council of the European Union under its Treaty of
Nice rules [6] have a dimension of exactly 3. Kurz and Napel [10] have established
that the dimension of the voting system of the Council of the European Union under its
Treaty of Lisbon rules is between 7 and 13 368.
There are obviously alternative ways for representing simple games. The codimen-
sion [7] is the minimum number of weighted games it takes to represent a simple game
as a union of weighted games. Considering arbitrary combinations of unions and inter-
sections leads to the notion of boolean dimension, which is introduced and studied in
[5].
2.1 Outline of the Paper
The next section introduces the notation and the formal definitions for simple games.
We also give a brief introduction for readers not familiar with covering codes. The
algorithm behind our first upper bound on dn is then presented in two sections. The first
of the sections demonstrates how the algorithm works and the second section contains
the technical details and proofs including a formal statement of the upper bound in
terms of a theorem. The second upper bound and our second theorem is then presented
in a section and finally, we wrap the paper up in the conclusion.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the concepts and definitions that we consider in this paper.
We start by presenting formal definitions for simple games. After that we give a brief
introduction to covering codes.
3.1 Simple Games
We now formally the define simple games:
Definition 1. A simple game Γ = (N,W ) is a pair where N = {1, . . . , n} for some
positive integer n and W ⊆ 2N is a collection of subsets of N such that:
• ∅ /∈W
• N ∈ W
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• S ⊆ T ⊆ N and S ∈W implies T ∈W
The members of N are referred to as players and subsets of N are referred to as
coalitions. A coalition is said to be winning if it is a member of W and otherwise it
is said to be losing. The first condition says that the coalition with no players loses
and the second condition ensures that the coalition containing all players wins. The
third condition is the monotonicity condition that says that any superset of a winning
coalition is also winning. The set of losing coalitions is denoted by L = 2N \W .
A coalition is a maximal losing coalition if it is losing and all of its supersets are
winning. The collection of coalitions LM ⊂ 2N contains all the maximal losing coali-
tions. The collection of minimal winning coalitions Wm is defined accordingly. A
simple game Γ can be defined by either of the sets W , L, Wm or LM .
The weighted games that form a proper subset of the simple games are defined as
follows:
Definition 2. A simple game Γ = (N,W ) is weighted if there exists a quota q ∈ R+
and weights w1, w2, . . . , wn ∈ R+ such that S ∈ W if and only if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. In
this case we use the notation Γ = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn].
The intersection Γ1 ∩ Γ2 of the games Γ1(N,W1) and Γ2(N,W2) is the simple
game with players N and W = W1 ∩ W2. As previously mentioned, Taylor and
Zwicker [14] have shown that any simple game can be expressed as the intersection
of |LM | weighted games: For any game Γ, we have Γ = ∩T∈LMΓT where a coalition
S wins in ΓT if and only if S 6⊆ T . A weighted representation of ΓT using weights 0
and 1 is given as follows: the game has quota 1 and a player in N \ T is assigned the
weight 1 and all other players are assigned weight 0.
The dimension of a simple game can now be formally defined:
Definition 3. The dimension d of a simple game Γ is the smallest positive integer such
that Γ = ∩di=1Γd where the games Γi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, are weighted.
In this paper, we let dn denote the maximum dimension that we can observe for a
simple game with n players.
A maximal losing coalition cannot contain another maximal losing coalition, so we
can apply Sperner’s Lemma [11] and get the following upper bound on LM :
∣∣LM ∣∣ ≤(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
. From the construction by Taylor and Zwicker, we conclude the following:
dn ≤ |LM | ≤
(
n
⌊n2 ⌋
)
. (3)
The main objective of this paper is to improve this upper bound.
We will illustrate the definitions by an example.
Example 1. Let the simple game Γ(N,LM ) be defined as follows:
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
LM = {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5, 6}} .
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The coalition {1, 2} loses in Γ since {1, 2} ⊆ {1, 2, 3}. The coalition {1, 4} wins since
{1, 4} 6⊆ {1, 2, 3} and {1, 4} 6⊆ {3, 4, 5, 6}.
If we use the construction by Taylor and Zwicker, we get this representation of Γ as
the intersection of two weighted games:
Γ = [1; 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1]∩ [1; 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1] .
The dimension of Γ is 2 since Γ cannot be weighted. We can realize this using a proof
by contradiction that illustrates a classical way of establishing lower bounds for the
dimension:
Assume that Γ was weighted with quota q. The coalitions {1, 2} and {4, 5} are both
losing so the total weight of the players in the coalitions must be strictly smaller than
2q. The two coalitions can exchange players and both win after the exchange: {1, 4}
and {2, 5}. We now arrive at a contradiction since the total weight of the players must
be at least 2q.
We now turn our attention to covering codes.
3.2 Covering Codes
A binary code is technically a set of bit vectors. A bit vector x = x1x2 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n
can be viewed as the coalition Sx = {i ∈ N : xi = 1}. We will use this perspective and
see a binary code as a collection of coalitions in order to align the notation of binary
codes and simple games. The Hamming distance between two bit vectors is the number
of coordinates where the two bit vectors differ. Using the perspective just described, we
can define the Hamming distance between two coalitions x and y as follows:
d(x, y) = |x \ y|+ |y \ x| .
A binary covering code [4] of length n and covering radius 1 can consequently
be perceived as a collection C ⊂ 2N of coalitions such that any coalition is within
Hamming distance 0 or 1 from at least one member of C: ∀x ∈ 2N∃c ∈ C : d(x, c) ≤
1. As an example, covering codes have applications within data compression. In this
paper,Kn denotes the minimum cardinality of a binary covering code of length n with
covering radius 1
Example 2. The following set represents a binary covering code with length 4 and
covering radius 1:
C = {{}, {4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}
As an example, the coalition {2, 4} is covered by the coalition {4} in C since the
Hamming distance between these coalitions is 1.
It is not possible to cover all subsets of {1, 2, 3, 4}with fewer coalitions – we cannot
cover more than 3 · 5 = 15 coalitions with 3 coalitions and there are 16 coalitions in
total so our example shows that K4 = 4.
As we saw earlier, a coalition cannot cover more than n + 1 other coalitions in-
cluding itself within radius 1 so we need at least 2n/(n + 1) coalitions for a binary
5
covering code with covering radius 1. The well known Hamming codes [2] defined for
n = 2m − 1 are so called perfect codes that meet this lower bound. For n = 2m,
we have the slightly smaller value in the denominator: Kn = 2n/n [13]. In general,
it is hard to establish exact values for Kn but it is not hard to prove the upper bound
Kn ≤ (ln(n+ 1) + 1)2n/(n+ 1) using a classical result1 from Alon and Spencer [1]
on computing dominating sets.
4 The First Upper Bound
From now on, any simple game will be defined using maximal losing coalitions. Given
a simple game Γ(N,LM ), we now present an algorithm producing a representation of
Γ as an intersection of no more than Kn weighted games. In this section, we will show
how the algorithm works step by step. Each step will contain a formal explanation but
we will also illustrate how each step works through an example. The technical details
including the proof of correctness will follow in the next section.
The key idea for the algorithm is the result of a simple observation expressed by
the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If LM = ∪pi=1Li then
Γ(N,LM ) = ∩pi=1Γ(N,Li) .
Proof. Now assume that x ⊆ N is losing in Γ(N,LM ). There must be an y ∈ LM
such that x ⊆ y. This means that x loses in any of the games Γ(N,Li) with y ∈ Li.
On the other hand, x will lose in Γ(N,LM ) if x loses in ∩pi=1Γ(N,Li) since x must
be a subset of at least one y that is a member of LM .
The objective for our algorithm is to use the lemma and partition LM into a small
number of sets such that all the corresponding games are weighted.
The game that we use as an example is the following simple game with players
{1, 2, 3, 4}: A coalition wins if and only if both of the players 1 and 2 are members of
the coalition or both of the players 3 or 4 are members. As an example, the coalition
{1, 2, 4} wins since both of the players 1 and 2 have joined the coalition. On the other
hand, the coalition {1, 3} is losing – and in fact it is a maximal losing coalition since
this coalition will turn into a winning coalition if any of the other players joint it. As
a side remark, this game belongs to a class of simple games that has been studied in
detail by Freixas and Puente [8].
We are now ready to describe how our algorithm works:
4.1 Input
The input to the algorithm is a simple game Γ(N,LM ). Example:
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
1Consider the graph where we have a vertex for each coalition and an edge between two vertices if and
only if the distance between the corresponding coalitions is 1. A covering code corresponds to a dominating
set in this graph where all vertices have degree n. Alon and Spencer present a lower bound for the size of
such a dominating set. This upper bound is probably well known within the coding theory community.
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LM = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}}
4.2 Step 1
Construct a collection of coalitions C ⊂ 2N such that any coalition in LM is within
Hamming distance 0 or 1 from at least one coalition inC: ∀x ∈ LM∃c ∈ C : d(x, c) ≤
1. Example:
C = {{4}, {1, 2, 3}}
4.3 Step 2
Let {Lc}c∈C be a partition of LM such that all members of Lc have distance 0 or 1 to
c: ∀x ∈ Lc : d(x, c) ≤ 1. Example:
L{4} = {{1, 4}, {2, 4}}
L{1,2,3} = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}
4.4 Step 3
For each c ∈ C, we now represent Γ(N,Lc) as a weighted game [qc;wc1, wc2, . . . , wcn].
We prove that Γ(N,Lc) is weighted for any c ∈ C and provide the details on how to
compute the weights and the quota in Lemma 2 below. Example:
Γ(N,L{4}) = [2; 1, 1, 2, 0]
Γ(N,L{1,2,3}) = [2; 1, 1, 0, 2]
4.5 Output
Finally, we can use Lemma 1 and express Γ as the intersection of the weighted games
that we have constructed in Step 3: Γ = ∩c∈C [qc;wc1, wc2, . . . , wcn]. Example:
Γ = [2; 1, 1, 2, 0]∩ [2; 1, 1, 0, 2]
This concludes the description of our algorithm.
In Step 1, we can actually use a binary covering code of length n with covering
radius 1 for any simple game involving n players. As a consequence, any simple game
can be implemented as the intersection of no more than Kn weighted games. This
allows us to set up the following upper bounds on dn using the facts on Kn from the
previous section:
dn ≤ Kn = 2
n
n+ 1
for n = 2m − 1 (4)
dn ≤ Kn = 2
n
n
for n = 2m (5)
dn ≤ Kn ≤ (ln(n+ 1) + 1) 2
n
n+ 1
for all n . (6)
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Table 1: This table displays lower and upper bounds for dn combining our findings
with the results from [13] and [12].
n Lower bound Upper bound
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)− 1
6 4 12 19
7 7 16 34
8 14 32 69
9 18 62 125
10 36 120 251
11 66 192 461
12 132 380 923
13 166 704 1715
14 325 1408 3431
15 585 2048 6434
In all three cases, the upper bounds are considerably smaller than
(
n
⌊n
2
⌋
)
which can
be seen from (2). The first two upper bounds represent an improvement on roughly a
factor
√
n and the bounds are all o(
(
n
⌊n
2
⌋
)
).
It is important to observe that it might be a bad idea to use a binary covering code as
a ”one size fits all”-solution since we do not exploit the structure of LM for the specific
game at hand if we follow this approach.
Osterga˚rd and Kaikkonen [13] have listed some upper bounds for Kn that we also
can use as upper bounds for dn. Table 1 presents these upper bounds together with
lower bounds from [12].
5 Technical Details for the First Upper Bound
We now take another look at our approach where we formally prove our first upper
bound and state the bound as a theorem.
We have to ensure is that our algorithm is correct in the sense that it is able to
express any input game as an intersection of weighted games. It is clearly possible to
produce the collection C in Step 1 and to construct the partition of LM in Step 2. The
algorithm uses the decomposition approach suggested by Lemma 1 so we only have to
check that all the games considered in Step 3 are weighted.
Lemma 2. Γ(N,Lc) is weighted for any c ∈ C.
Proof. All the members of Lc are maximal losing coalitions so it is not possible to
find two members of Lc such that one of them contains the other. This means there
are three cases that we have to consider: 1) ∀x ∈ Lc : x ⊂ c, 2) Lc = {c}, or 3)
∀x ∈ Lc : c ⊂ x. We now show how to express Γ(N,Lc) as a weighted game in all
three cases.
Case 1: The set Lc consists of coalitions were exactly one element has been re-
moved from c for each member of Lc. Let R denote the set of removed elements:
R = ∪x∈Lc(c \ x). Let us consider a set S that is winning and is contained in c. For
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any x ∈ Lc, we know that S is not contained in x so S must contain the element that
has been removed from c to form x. In other words, S cannot win in Γ(N,Lc) unless
S \ c 6= ∅ or R ⊆ S. On the other hand, it is not hard see that S wins if S \ c 6= ∅
or R ⊆ S. This means that we can implement Γ(N,Lc) as the weighted game with
q = |R| and weights as follows: wi = |R| for i 6∈ c, wi = 1 for i ∈ R and wi = 0 for
the remaining players.
As an example, we consider the game Γ(N,Lc) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, c =
{1, 2, 3, 4} and Lc = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}. For this game we have R =
{2, 3, 4} and Γ(N,Lc) = [3; 0, 1, 1, 1, 3].
Case 2: In this case, we can use the weighted game with quota q = 1 where we
assign the weight 0 to all players in c and the weight 1 to all other players.
Case 3: All the members of Lc are constructed by adding exactly one element to
c. Let A denote the set of added elements: A = ∪x∈Lc(x \ c). If a coalition S wins
and S does not contain any players in c ∪ A then S has to contain at least two players
in A (otherwise S would lose). Conversely, S wins if S contains a player not in c ∪ A
or at least two of the players in A. This implies that Γ(N,Lc) can be expressed as a
weighted game with quota q = 2 and the following weight distribution: wi = 2 for
i 6∈ c ∪ A, wi = 1 for i ∈ A and wi = 0 for the players in c.
An example for case 3: Γ(N,Lc) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, c = {1, 2, 3}
and Lc = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 6}}. Here we have A = {4, 5, 6} and
Γ(N,Lc) = [2; 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2].
We are now ready to formally state the main contribution of our paper:
Theorem 1. Let Γ(N,LM ) be a simple game and let C ⊂ 2N be a collection of
coalitions such that ∀x ∈ LM∃c ∈ C : d(x, c) ≤ 1. The dimension of Γ(N,LM ) is
bounded from above by |C|.
Proof. We can use our algorithm to produce a representation of Γ as the intersection of
|C| weighted games. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 guarantee that our algorithm is correct.
It is important to note that the special case C = LM corresponds to the |LM |-upper
bound presented by Taylor and Zwicker [14].
If we have a binary covering code with covering radius 1 then we can use it as C in
the theorem. We therefore have the following corollary:
Corollary 1.
dn ≤ Kn
It is important to stress that we only requireC to ”cover” the set LM in the theorem
above. We might be able to exploit the structure of LM in order to achieve a better
upper bound than in the corollary where the underlying collection covers all possible
coalitions. As an example, we might use the fact that LM is a Sperner family where no
member contains another member of the family. This explains why we have chosen to
express the bound dn ≤ Kn as a corollary since the theorem is a stronger result.
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6 The Second Upper Bound
In this section, we will once again use the key idea from Lemma 1 and prove another
upper bound generalizing the |LM |-upper bound presented by Taylor and Zwicker [14].
This upper bound is related to SECDED codes that are binary codes where any two of
the members have pairwise distance at least 4.
Theorem 2. Let Γ(N,LM ) be a simple game. The dimension of Γ(N,LM ) is bounded
from above by 12 (|LM |+|C|) for some collectionC ⊆ LM of maximal losing coalitions
satisfying ∀x, y ∈ C : d(x, y) ≥ 4.
Proof. Let M be a maximal set of pairs (x, y) ∈ LM × LM such that x 6= y and
d(x, y) ≤ 3 and such that an element in LM occurs in no more than one pair. We claim
that the game Γ(N, {x, y}) is weighted for any (x, y) ∈ M . We will prove it for the
case d(x, y) = 3 and leave the only remaining case d(x, y) = 2 to the reader (there are
no more cases since LM is a Sperner family).
Without loss of generality, we assume that x \ y contains two players and y \ x
contains one player. A coalition wins in the game if and only if: 1) the coalition contains
at least one player in N \ (x∪y), or 2) the coalition contains one of the players in x\ y
and the player in y \ x. We implement the game Γ(N, {x, y}) as a weighted game with
quota q = 3. The players in N \ (x ∪ y) get weight 3. The two players in x \ y get
weight 1 and the player in y \ x gets weight 2. All the players in x∩ y are assigned the
weight 0.
Let us illustrate the construction with the example with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7},
x = {1, 2, 3, 4} and y = {2, 3, 5}. The corresponding weighted game is [3; 1, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 3].
Let C be the set of coalitions that have not been paired in M . All the coalitions
in C have pairwise distance at least 4 since M is maximal. The pairs in M and the
coalitions in C considered as single element sets constitute a partition of LM where
all the corresponding games are weighted. This partition consists of no more than
1
2 (|LM | − |C|) + |C| coalitions.
A corollary of the theorem is as follows:
Corollary 2. The dimension of Γ(N,LM ) is less than |LM | if LM is not a SECDED
code.
7 Conclusion
We have presented two new upper bounds on the maximum dimension dn for sim-
ple games with n players. The bounds are related to binary codes and they represent
improvements of the |LM |-upper bound presented by Taylor and Zwicker [14].
The recent development [12] for the lower bound of dn can be illustrated as follows:
2
n
2
−1 → 1
n
(
n
⌊n2 ⌋
)
= (1− o(1))
√
2
pin
2n
n
≤ dn . (7)
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On the other hand, one of the upper bounds in our paper represents the following im-
provement with respect to the upper bound for n = 2m − 1:
dn ≤ 2
n
n+ 1
← (1− o(1))
√
2
pin
2n =
(
n
⌊n2 ⌋
)
(8)
The dimensionality gap for the simple games is now considerably smaller and the upper
bound is roughly within a factor
√
n away from the lower bound for some values of n.
As previously mentioned, we only have to cover LM with a binary covering code
with radius 1 to obtain an upper bound on the dimension as expressed by Theorem 1. It
is not known – at least to the authors of this paper – whether it is possible but it seems
plausible to improve the upper bound from (8) by using the fact that LM has a certain
structure.
The key idea behind our upper bounds is to decompose LM into a union of col-
lections of maximal losing coalitions such that any of the simple games defined by the
component collections are weighted. This can be done in many ways and it is highly
likely that there are smarter decompositions than the ones presented in our paper. It is
an open problem to find smarter decompositions.
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